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ABSTRACT 
This paper advances the following criticisms against the received view of implicatures: (1) 
implicatures are relations of pragmatic implication and not attempts to convey particular speaker 
meanings; (2) conversational implicatures are non-cancellable; (3) generalised conversational 
implicatures and conventional implicatures are necessary to preserve the cooperative assumption 
by means of a conversational maxim of conveyability; (4) implicatures should be divided in 
utterance implicatures and assumption implicatures, not speaker implicatures and sentence 
implicatures; (5) trivial implicatures are genuine implicatures; (6) Grice’s theory of conversation 
cannot explain most of his own examples of particularised conversational implicatures; (7) the 
apparent attempts of explicit cancellation of implicatures are apologies, not attempts to avoid 
misunderstandings.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is not an exhaustive analysis of 
every minutia presented in the contemporary 
debate about implicatures. In fact, any 
endeavour of this kind would be fruitless, 
since the contemporary debate was heavily 
influenced by the received view of 
implicatures criticised in this paper. The 
received view of implicatures is marred by 
basic conceptual mistakes that were inherited 
from Grice’s seminal work and piled up as the 
literature on the subject grew. We got to the 
point where the most basic features of 
implicatures are disputed. The only way out 
of this standoff is a revision of the received 
view of implicatures. This will require not 
only a stricter examination of Grice’s work on 
implicatures as some digging into the origins 
of the concept.  
2. IMPLICATURES ARE RELATIONS OF 
PRAGMATIC IMPLICATION 
The phenomenon in which an utterance 
pragmatically implies a proposition was 
identified early on by different authors, but it 
was not until Grice that it received its first 
systematisation and became part of a 
theoretical framework with explanatory 
power. In order to prevent any potential 
confusion of pragmatic implication with logic 
implication, Grice nicknamed the first 
‘implicature’ and attributed to it a central role 
in his theory of conversation. This theoretical 
role turned implicatures into one of the most 
important concepts in pragmatics. This 
theoretical success, however, came with a 
price. In the process of unifying a wide 
variety of linguistic phenomena associated 
w i t h p r a g m a t i c i m p l i c a t i o n , G r i c e 
inadvertently distorted the concept by 
confusing relations of pragmatic implication 
with attempts to convey particular speaker 
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meanings. What is worse, this erroneous idea 
have been the most influential concept in 
Grice’s theory of conversation. This crucial 
mistake will become clear once we consider 
how the notion of pragmatic implication 
inherited by Grice was used before his work .  1
One of the earlier proponents of the use of 
pragmatic implication was G. E. Moore, who 
argued that the use of an indicative sentence 
involves both the assertion of the content of a 
sentence and the implication that there is a 
compromise with the truth of its content . 2
Moore introduced the distinction in an 
attempt to explain the famous paradox that 
now receives his own name. Suppose one 
says: ‘It is raining here, but I don’t believe it 
is’. This is puzzling utterance seems 
paradoxical even though it is logically 
consistent. What is wrong? The paradoxical 
nature of this sentence, argued Moore, lies in 
the fact that the pragmatic implication that 
follows from the first conjunct is contradicted 
by what is asserted in the second conjunct. 
O’Connor would later identify puzzles of 
this kind as pragmatic paradoxes. Sentences 
with the form ‘P, but I don’t believe that P’ 
may not be logically contradictory, but they 
are pragmatically self-refuting. Thus, the 
example is not so much a logical paradox as a 
pragmatic paradox . Moore’s paradox 3
specifically occurs because some epistemic 
assumptions are implied by people’s 
behaviour. Therefore, any attempt to deny 
them will be pragmatically self-refuting. 
This way of thinking is relevant to 
understand Grice’s own argumentation. In a 
way, Grice can be interpreted as arguing that 
since cooperative assumptions are implied by 
language use, their apparent counter-
examples in conversation are pragmatically 
self-refuting. The self-refuting aspect of these 
counter-examples disappears once we realise 
that their uncooperative nature occurs at the 
level of what is said (or appears to be said) 
but not at the level of what is implicated.  
There are some significant differences 
though. Moore’s paradox involves an 
artificial statement that would never occur in 
natural language. This strange statement has a 
self-refuting nature because part of what it 
says contradicts a trivial implicature about the 
speaker’s own epistemic assumptions. In 
Grice’s discussion, the pragmatic paradoxes 
are present in everyday conversations. Their 
self-refuting aspects of these examples are 
explained by a contradiction between what 
the speaker says (or appears to say) and the 
trivial implication of cooperative expectation 
that follows from language use. Their 
paradoxical nature is then disarmed by the 
inference of additional implicatures that may 
be about the speaker’s assumptions or about 
his attempt to communicate something in a 
speaker meaning act. 
This notion of pragmatic implication was 
e m p l o y e d a f t e r w a r d s b y d i f f e r e n t 
philosophers in the 50s and 60s. P. H. 
Nowell-Smith and J. O. Urmson stand out 
because they were both colleagues of Grice in 
Austin’s discussion group in Oxford, the Play 
Group, and both anticipated ideas that are 
reminiscent of Grice’s posterior work. 
Nowell-Smith observed that we have rules of 
contextual implication that follow from 
language use, such as the rule that by stating 
something the speaker contextually implies 
that he believes the assertion is true. He also 
 The examples presented here are presented in more detail in Chapman’s brilliant scholarly work, ‘Paul Grice: 1
Philosopher and Linguist’ (cf. Chapman, 2005: 92–93).
 Moore (1942: 543).2
 O’Connor (1948).3
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added that this rule could be violated 
depending on the characteristics of the 
context, for instance, in case the speaker is 
being ironic . Nowell-Smith also suggest the 4
implied rule that the speaker should have 
good reasons for his statement and that what 
he says ‘may be assumed to be relevant to the 
interests of his audience’ . Urmson says 5
something practically identical when he 
observed that when a speaker states 
something there is an implication that he 
claims the truth of what he says. Unless, of 
course, the situation suggests otherwise, for 
instance, if the speaker is just reporting in an 
incredulous manner what another person 
said . Urmson also suggested that it is a 6
presupposition of communication that people 
will have some ground for their statements . 7
These rules pragmatically implied by 
language use are what Grice would later 
identify as the maxims of quality and 
relevance. 
Grice was obviously influenced by this 
notion of pragmatic implication. This 
becomes clear in his defence of a causal 
theory of perception in 1961. This theory 
analyses expressions such as ‘I am seeing 
something red’ as equivalent to ‘Something 
red is causally responsible (in an appropriate 
manner) to make it look that here is 
something red in front of me’. One objection 
against this explanation is that usually if 
someone sees something red he would not say 
‘This looks red to me’, but only ‘This is red’. 
Grice’s answer to this criticism is that we 
need to distinguish between what is literally 
said and what is pragmatically implied by the 
utterance. When one says ‘This looks red’ this 
utterance pragmatically implies that what he 
is seeing it is not red, but he didn’t literally 
say that what he is seeing it is not red . The 8
puzzle engendered by the causal theory of 
perception is explained by Grice in typical 
Moorian fashion by recognising the role of 
pragmatic implication.  
In 1967, Grice would present his William 
James lectures at Harvard University and 
completely change his approach. Not only he 
distinguished this notion of pragmatic 
implication from logical implication by 
renaming it ‘implicature’, but he also gave it 
an explanatory role in the dynamics of 
conversation. The examples of contextual 
implication presented by Nowell-Smith and 
Urmson are now dismissed. In Grice’s view 
the only genuine implicatures are assumptions 
that are not trivially required to maintain the 
cooperative presumption. The rules that are 
contextually implied by normal use preserve 
the cooperative presumption trivially and 
should be ignored. This scepticism was 
motivated by his interest in implicatures that 
prevent the occurrence of pragmatic 
paradoxes in conversation. The emphasis on 
particularised conversational implicatures and 
their association with their role in speaker 
meanings would prove costly.  
A speaker can intend to mean more by his 
utterance than what the words that he utters 
mean. What is conveyed beyond what an 
expression means is a speaker meaning. The 
speaker may be an implicit addition to the 
literal expression meaning (e.g., an ellipsis) or 
explicitly replaced it with a non-literal 
meaning (e.g., in figures of speech such as 
ironies or metaphors). Take metaphors for 
 Nowell-Smith (1954: 81).4
 Nowell-Smith (1954: 82).5
 Urmson (1952: 483).6
 Urmson (1952: 483).7
 Grice (1961: 124).8
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instance. What the speaker says in a metaphor 
such as ‘You are the cream in my coffee’ 
would violate a maxim of quality if 
interpreted literally. In order to preserve the 
assumption that the speaker is being 
cooperative, the hearer will assume that the 
speaker is trying to say something else in a 
non-literal manner. The speaker is probably 
attributing to his audience some features that 
resembles the cream in the coffee.  
The interesting thing is that the speaker is 
able to communicate a meaning that goes 
beyond the conventional meaning of the 
words by means of an implicature that can be 
inferred by the hearer. It is implicated by the 
speaker ’s utterance, the cooperation 
presumption and related maxims that he is 
trying to say something else. Now, notice that 
we can describe this process as if the speaker 
was able to exploit these conversation 
dynamics in a systematic way to convey 
implicatures. Another similar way of 
describing the example is that the attempt to 
convey a speaker meaning is as an attempt to 
convey an implicature. This loose way of 
talking suggests that the speaker implicates 
something when is convey a speaker 
meaning, and that an implicature is an 
intentionally conveyed meaning. But this is a 
confusion. When we say that the speaker 
implicates something, the speaker is not really 
doing an implicating action at all, since the 
implicature is a pragmatic implication that 
can be inferred by a hearer given what the 
speaker says in a particular context and the 
cooperative assumption. 
This confusion is still one of the most 
c o m m o n m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a b o u t 
implicatures and it is evidenced in Grice’s 
testimonial example: 
‘Dear Sir, Mr X’s command of English is 
excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been 
regular. Yours, etc.’ The information given is 
grossly inadequate; the writer appears to be 
seriously in breach of the first maxim of Quantity, 
enjoining the utterer to give as much information 
as is appropriate. However, the receiver of the 
letter is able to deduce that the writer, as the 
candidate’s tutor, must know more than this about 
the candidate. There must be some reason why the 
writer is reluctant to offer the extra information 
that would be helpful. The most obvious reason is 
that the writer does not want explicitly to 
comment on Mr X’s philosophical ability, because 
it is not possible to do so without writing 
something socially unpleasant. The writer is 
therefore taken conversationally to implicate that 
Mr X is no good at philosophy; the letter is 
cooperative not at the level of what is literally 
said, but at the level of what is implicated. In 
examples such as this a maxim is deliberately and 
ostentatiously flouted in order to give rise to a 
conversational implicature; such examples 
involve exploitation . 9
Grice’s remark that ‘the speaker is being 
informative not at the level of what is said, 
but on the level of what is implicated’, 
betrays his belief that the speaker is being 
informative in an indirect manner by 
consciously conveying a veiled message, and 
that this communicative act would be the 
implicature. But implicatures are pragmatic 
implications that can be reconstructed or 
inferred from what the speaker says (or 
pretend to say) and the conversational norms, 
not something that a speaker does by himself.  
This passage also suggests a view of 
implicature that is also incompatible with 
Grice’s own theory of meaning and the 
plausible intuition that speakers can’t say 
something without meaning it, for saying 
something is meaning it. If a speaker is trying 
to be informative by implicating something, 
this is what he means and what he wants to 
say. However, this would suggest that the 
 Grice (1975: 52).9
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speaker can mean two things at once, the 
l i tera l meaning and the non- l i tera l 
(implicated) meaning, which is implausible. 
At best, a speaker can pretend to say 
something (or making as if to say something) 
in order to say something else, but this non-
literal meaning is what he wanted to 
communicate in the first place.  
Another passage in which Grice appears 
to commit the same mistake is when he 
presents his rationale for refusing trivial 
implicatures: 
On my account, it will not be true that when I say 
that p, I conversationally implicate that I believe 
that p; for to suppose that I believe that p (or 
rather think of myself as believing that p) is just 
to suppose that I am observing the first maxim of 
Quality on this occasion. I think that this 
consequence is intuitively acceptable; it is not a 
natural use of language to describe one who has 
said that p as having, for example, “implied,” 
“indicated,” or “suggested” that he believes that 
p; the natural thing to say is that he has expressed 
(or at least purported to express) the belief that p. 
He has of course committed himself, in a certain 
way, to its being the case that he believes that p, 
and while this commitment is not a case of saying 
that he believes that p, it is bound up, in a special 
way, with saying that p. The nature of the 
connection will, I hope, become apparent when I 
say something about the function of the 
indicative mood . 10
Grice’s criticism in this passage only make 
sense if we understand that the speaker 
‘implied’ his belief in p as an action of 
consciously suggesting his belief in p. But 
when we say that ‘the speaker implies his 
belief in p by asserting p’ this only means that 
‘by asserting p and given the conversation 
norms, it follows that the speaker believes in 
p’.  
Now, consider Grice’s example in which 
an implicature is conveyed by a violation of 
the requirement to avoid obscurity: 
Suppose that A and B are having a conversation in 
the presence of a third party, for example, a child, 
then A might be deliberately obscure, though not 
too obscure, in the hope that B would understand 
and the third party not. Furthermore, if A expects 
B to see that A is being deliberately obscure, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that A is implicating 
that the contents of his communication should not 
be imparted to the third party . 11
In other words, A is implicating to B that the 
child shouldn’t understand the contents of the 
conversation in the sense that he is suggesting 
or conveying a message in a veiled or indirect 
manner. But this would imply that A must do 
two things at once: say something to B in a 
more obscure manner and indirectly say that 
the child shouldn’t understand what is being 
said. It would be more reasonable to suggest 
that A knew that B would infer from what is 
being said that he doesn’t want to be explicit 
in front of the child.  
The confusion between implicatures and 
speaker meaning acts is recurrent in the 
literature about the subject. Take for instance 
the following passage of Bach: 
It is in uttering sentences that speakers implicate 
things. Yet for some reason, implicatures are often 
attributed to sentences themselves. Perhaps that’s 
because implicatures are often illustrated with the 
help of numbered sentences, which are then 
confused with utterances, which are then treated 
as if they are agents rather than as the actions that 
they are. Anyway, Grice was careful to use the 
verb implicate, not imply, for what speakers do, 
and he coined the term implicature to use instead 
of implication for what speakers implicate .  12
 Grice (1978: 114).10
 Grice (1975: 55).11
 Bach (2006b: 22).12
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Speakers say (or make as if they say) certain 
things. These are actions. What follows from 
what they say (or make as if they say) given 
the conversational maxims and context is not 
an action, but an implication process. The 
u t t e r a n c e o f a s p e a k e r g i v e n t h e 
conversational norms and context implicates 
something in the same sense that a group of 
premises in a valid argumentative form 
implicates something: if the premises are true, 
one can be sure that the conclusion is true. It 
doesn’t make sense to talk about the 
implication relation between premises and 
conclusion of a valid argumentative form as 
an action. For the same reason, it doesn’t 
make sense to talk about the relation of 
pragmatic implication between the utterance 
of a cooperative speaker and the implicatum 
as an action.   
Bach is also against the idea that anything 
‘that may be inferred from the fact that a 
speaker uttered a certain sentence is an 
implicature’: 
For example, there is the claim that if you assert 
something, you implicate that you believe it, you 
implicate that your audience should believe it, and 
you implicate that it is worthy of belief. This 
claim overlooks, among other things, the 
distinction between what a speaker means (has a 
communicative intention to convey), which is the 
content of an utterance (over and above its 
semantic content), and what the conditions are for 
making the utterance felicitously. Also, a 
speaker’s saying a certain thing might reveal 
information about him, such as that he craves 
attention, that he hates his father and loves his 
mother, or that he has a certain ulterior motive, 
but such bits of inferable information aren’t 
implicated unless they’re part of what he means . 13
But the only occasions where what the 
speaker means what is implicated is in 
speaker’s meaning examples where the 
implicatum is the intended non-literal 
meaning or part of the intended meaning 
(ellipsis).  
The idea of particularized conversational 
implicatures as something intentionally 
conveyed beyond conventional meaning have 
been the most influential concept in Grice’s 
theory of conversation. Introductory texts 
about the subject tend to focus on 
particularised conversational implicatures 
because of this erroneous idea. What is worse, 
all major pragmatic theories will dispute 
different aspects of Grice’s theory, including 
the explanation of conversation in terms of 
coopera t ive p r inc ip le and maxims , 
generalized implicatures and conventional 
implicatures, but none of them will refuse the 
notion of particularized conversational 
implicatures as something intentionally 
conveyed beyond conventional meaning. 
The idea that implicatures are speaker 
meaning acts also explains why there is still 
so much debate about phenomena that could 
be easily explained as examples of ellipsis. As 
we saw before, in an ellipsis there is an 
omission of words that the hearer is able to 
infer from the context. For instance, the 
assertion of ‘John is late’ is not a complete 
proposition since he must be late for 
something. The context may suggest that he is 
late for work. The hearer will then complete 
the missing portion of what the speaker 
meant, e.g., ‘John is late for work’. Now, it 
has been suggested that these examples 
require a more complicated explanation in 
terms of ‘impliciture’ or ‘explicature’, instead 
 Bach (2006b: 26).13
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of being interpreted as an ellipsis whose 
content is conversationally implicated . The 14
theoretical details that accompany each 
concept are different , but the underlying 15
rationale in both cases is the same: since an 
implicature is something that the speaker 
means beyond the conventional meaning, 
then they can’t be responsible for the 
examples of complet ion. But s ince 
implicatures are not non-literal speaker 
meanings, this point is moot. 
The confusion between implicatures and 
speaker meaning is also one of the main 
reasons why some authors regard generalised 
conversational implicatures and conventional 
implicatures with scepticism. Grice himself 
stated that conventional implicatures should 
be better explained before ‘any free use of it, 
for explanatory purposes’ . We can sum up 16
the crux of the matter as follows: (1) 
particularised conversational implicatures 
examples are widely accepted as the 
paradigmatic examples of implicatures; (2) 
those examples ensure inferences about what 
a speaker means in a non-literal or non-
explicit manner (figures of speech, ellipsis, 
etc.); (3) those speaker meaning acts are then 
confused with the implicature process itself, 
which is just a relation of pragmatic 
implication; (4) generalised conversational 
implicatures and conventional implicatures 
only ensure inferences about speakers’ 
assumptions, but they don’t attribute 
communicative intentions to speakers; (5) 
since generalised conversational implicatures 
and conventional implicatures examples are 
transparently different from particularised 
ones, they are not perceived as implicatures.  
What is interesting is that the only 
uncontroversial idea of Grice was his worst 
mistake, whereas his most plausible ideas, 
such as generalised and conventional 
implicatures, are controversial because of this 
i n f l u e n t i a l m i s t a k e . G e n e r a l i s e d 
conversational implicatures and conventional 
implicatures are challenged precisely because 
their character as implicatures is pronounced 
and can’t be associated with speaker meaning 
acts. Be that as it may, the attempts to refute 
these solid notions faced numerous problems. 
Bach tried to challenge the coherence of the 
concept of conventional implicature by 
explaining the supposed examples of 
conventional implicatures as involving two 
types of entailment. For instance, the 
conjunction ‘The player is tall, but agile’ 
entails the conjunction ‘The player is tall, and 
he is agile’ (primary entailment), and ‘If the 
player is tall, he is not agile’ (secondary 
entailment). The supposed implicature in this 
case is a secondary entailment, which does 
not affect the truth conditions of the 
conjunction and its primary entailment . 17
Bach intends to maintain this idea by 
observing that the alleged vehicles of 
conventional implicatures can occur in 
indirect descriptions of utterances. Thus, 
Mary could have said ‘Shaq is enormous, but 
agile’ and this could be described indirectly as 
‘Marv said that Shaq is enormous, but she is 
agile’. Bach then suggests that the supposed 
implicature associated with the use of ‘but’ is 
an integral element of what is literally said . 18
 Bach (1994) is a proponent of implicitures, while Sperber & Wilson (1986) and Carston (2002) are exponents of 14
explicatures. 
 See Bach (2006a) for a detailed exposition on the subject. 15
 Grice (1978: 117).16
 Bach (1999).17
 Bach (1999: 339).18
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Bach’s argumentation, however, is 
problematic. Consider the idea that the use of 
‘but’ involves entailment relations. His 
explanation implies that the secondary 
entailment, the supposed implicature, is 
incompatible with the very conjunction 
asserted in this context. The speaker asserted 
the conjunction with the form ‘A, but B’ when 
he accepts both A and B. In this case we have 
a primary entailment such as ‘A and B’, and 
the secondary entailment such as ‘if A, then 
not-B’. Since the speaker accepts A, the 
secondary entailment can only be true if not-B 
can also be true. However, the speaker 
already accepts the truth of B. Thus, the 
secondary entailment that should be the 
substitute of the alleged implicature must be 
false!  
Bach could reformulate the explanation 
by representing the secondary entailment as a 
proposition ‘Usually, tall players are not 
agi le’ , which is compatible with a 
conjunction. However, this explanation still 
faces difficulties. Instead of postulating two 
entailed propositions, it is more plausible to 
interpret these cases as involving two 
assumptions that we can attribute to the 
speaker, namely, the trivial assumption that he 
accepts the two conjuncts, and the additional 
assumption that he would not expect that the 
two conjuncts were simultaneously true. 
Moreover, the indirect descriptions of 
what is said by another speaker must be fine 
grained enough to involve distinctions 
between semant ics and pragmat ics , 
propositional content and grammatical form, 
assertion and implicature, etc. However, 
Bach’s example does not involve these 
distinctions. By stating ‘Marv said that Shaq 
is enormous, but he is agile’, everything that 
the speaker does is to indirectly quote the 
speech acts of the speaker, which does not 
involve not only what it was said, but also the 
manner by what was said was said, and this 
can be implicated (or assumed) by the 
speaker. To think that an indirect description 
offered in the exampled would involve only 
what is said would be circular reasoning. 
One way to avoid the confusion between 
implicatures and speaker meaning acts is to 
emphasise Grice’s distinction between 
‘implicature’, the pragmatic implication, and 
‘implicatum’, what is implicated . The 19
implicatum may include linguistic items as 
varied as speakers’ assumptions, speakers’ 
presuppositions, speakers’ non-literal 
meanings and ellipses. These items were also 
sloppily designated by Grice as implicatures 
in some occasions, but they are not 
implicatures themselves, since they are not 
processes of pragmatic implications 
themselves. If this distinction is not 
acknowledged, one may be lead to believe 
that implicature (the process), must be 
identified with one particular item that is 
implicated (the content). 
Finally, the belief the some implicatures 
are embedded is easily explained if 
implicatures are understood as pragmatic 
implications. Thus, from the assertion of 
‘John believes that there are four students on 
the class’ it follows that John doesn’t believe 
that there are more than four students in the 
class simply because John’s belief can be 
inferred from this indirect statement.  
3. CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES 
ARE NON-CANCELLABLE 
The utterance in given a conversational 
context and the cooperative assumption will 
 Grice (1975: 157).19
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implicate certain truths either about what the 
speaker says or assumes. Grice thought that 
this implication relation should receive a 
different moniker in order to differentiate it 
from logical implication. The reason being 
that unlike logical implication, this pragmatic 
implication could be cancelled. Hence the 
name ‘implicature’. According to Grice, only 
particularised or generalised conversational 
implicatures could be cancelled. They can be 
cancelled either explicitly or implicitly . An 20
implicature P is explicitly cancellable if it is 
admissible to add qualifications such as ‘but 
not P’ or ‘I didn’t mean P’. Let’s take the 
garage example. Suppose that after I said that 
there is a garage round the corner I decided to 
add ‘But you won’t find any petrol in it. In 
fact, the garage is closed’. This qualification 
would amount to an explicit cancellation of 
the implicature.  
Jackson interpreted this implicature 
cancellation as a consequence of the 
defeasibility of inductive inferences, i.e., the 
fact that inductive inferences are non-
demonstrative and non-monotonic. An 
inductive argument which may seem strong 
can become implausible if we add additional 
premises. For instance, the inference ‘Every 
morning until now the farmer fed the chicken. 
Therefore, the farmer will feed the chicken 
tomorrow’ is defeated by the addition of the 
premise ‘The farmer will make a feast with 
the chicken tomorrow’. In the same way, 
implicatures could be interpreted as the 
conclusions of an inductive inference from 
premises which include assumptions about 
the conversational relevance of what is said 
by the speaker. To use an example presented 
by Jackson, by saying ‘John is hard working’, 
you can infer from this that I implicated that 
John is not very smart, but this inference 
could be defeated if I added ‘But with this I 
don’t want to suggest that he is not smart, 
since he is bright’ .   21
There is also an implicit cancellation if it 
is possible to find a situation in which the 
same assertion would not convey the same 
implicature. Suppose that A asks B whether a 
given student is smart and B answers this 
question by saying: ‘He is very dedicated’. 
The implicature in this context is that the 
student is not very bright. Now, suppose that 
the context was slightly different and A was 
asking B whether the student was hard 
working. In this context, the same statement 
would not convey the implicature that the 
student is not smart. 
But while it is undeniable that there are 
differences between logical and pragmatic 
conversational implication (e.g., unlike 
pragmatic implication, logical implication is 
guaranteed by the logical form of their 
premise(s) and conclusion), they are similar 
in regard to their non-cancellable nature. We 
can interpret a conversational implicature as a 
pragmatic implication where the premises are 
 Grice (1975: 57).20
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t h e c o o p e r a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n , t h e 
conversational context, and the utterance, 
while the conclusion is the proposition that 
follows from these premises . Conversational 22
implicatures are non-cancellable since there 
are no possible circumstances where the 
premises are true and the conclusion is 
false .  23
Conversational implicatures do seem 
cancellable but that is only conceivable if we 
ignore that the conversational context, which 
is one of the premises that generate the 
implicature. If we focus exclusively on the 
cooperative assumption and the utterance, it is 
easy to conceive a slightly different scenario 
where the implicatum does not follow. But 
that only happens if we disregard the original 
conversational context, which was one of the 
premises responsible for the pragmatic 
implication in the first place. In other words, 
the examples of cancellation of implicature 
don’t hold water because one of the premises 
of the implicature is missing in the examples.   
This problem is evident in the notion of 
implicit (or contextual) cancellation. Grice 
thinks that an implicature is implicitly 
cancelled when it is not conveyed by an 
assertion in a given context. This idea is 
strange, since it is more plausible to think that 
an implicature was not generated in a context 
in which was not conveyed, than to think that 
it was implicitly cancelled. In fact, to suggest 
that an implicature can be cancelled by the 
context is to ignore what makes the 
implicature occur in the first place. This 
would be much the same as if someone 
argued that a modus ponens inference can be 
cancelled if we consider a different context 
where one of the premises is missing.  
Despite appearances, putative examples of 
explicit cancellation are fundamentally 
similar to putative examples of implicit 
cancellation in the sense that they are also 
guilty of requiring a different conversational 
context that was one of the premises 
responsible for the implicature. It may seem 
that when an implicature is explicitly 
cancelled, the speaker adds a clause to block 
the implicature in the same context, but that’s 
incorrect. The conversational context also 
includes the intended meanings of the speaker 
that generated the implicature. The same 
utterance added with a qualification that 
intends to block the implicature means that 
one of the original premises responsible for 
the implicature was false after all. 
One could object that the context is not 
one of the premises, but this is implausible 
since without the conversational context, the 
implicature can’t be inferred. Another 
foreseeable objection is that the context is one 
of the premises, but it is not enough to ensure 
the implicature. Maybe the speaker is crazy 
enough to utter things without their usual 
meaning and making the hearer’s task of 
drawing the intended meaning impossible . 24
The natural answer to this objection is that 
one implicit premise of implicatures is that 
 The apparent violation of the cooperative assumption is one of the main premises in the generation of implicatures 22
involving ellipses and speaker’s non-literal meaning. However, for clarity of exposition, we shall neglect this detail. 
 Weiner (2006) presented two putative counter-examples—the Train Case and the Sex Pistols Case—in which a 23
conversational implicature cannot be cancelled by the speaker. Blome-Tillmann (2008) and Hazlett (2012) agree 
with him. Borge (2009: 151) objects that both attempts are not a real attempt of implicature cancellation. Dahlman 
(2013) offers a slightly different analysis of one of the putative counter-examples, but also concludes that they don’t 
work. Instead, she argued, they only show that a conversational implicature cannot be cancelled ‘if the speaker, 
whose utterance gives rise to the implicature, does not intend to cancel it’. I won’t discuss these examples since I 
will present a stronger case against cancellability: no conversational implicature can be cancellable due to the nature 
of implicatures themselves.
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the speaker has linguistic competence and 
behaves in a normal way. When this premise 
is acknowledged, the implicature ensues.   
In some examples the implicature appear 
cancellable because the conclusion is 
interpreted incorrectly. Take for instance this 
passage of Bach:   
The difference [between implicatures and 
implication] is fundamental. If a sentence is true, 
what it implies must be true, whereas a speaker 
can utter a true sentence and implicate something 
false. For example, you could say that there’s a 
gas station around the corner and falsely implicate 
that it’s open and selling gas (maybe it’s closed 
for the night or maybe there’s a gasoline 
shortage). If there’s a gas station around the 
corner, it doesn’t follow that the gas station is 
open and selling gas. But it does follow that the 
gas station is not directly across the street . 25
It can be argued that Bach didn’t make a 
proper assessment of the implicatum involved 
in this case. The implicature has as its 
premises both the utterance that there’s a gas 
station around the corner and the observance 
of conversation norms. The conclusion, i.e., 
the implicatum, is that the speaker believes 
that the gas station around the corner it’s open 
and selling gas. If these premises are true, the 
conclusion must be true.  
One could argue that the conclusion is the 
proposition that the gas station around the 
corner it’s open and selling gas, and not the 
speaker’s belief that the gas station around the 
corner it’s open and selling gas. But if that 
were the case, no implicature would be 
generated by the speaker’s utterance, since it 
doesn’t follow from his utterance and the 
conversational norms that the gas station 
around the corner it’s open and selling gas. If 
there is a pragmatic implication we call 
implicature, it is not cancellable due to its 
own nature. To have both an implication and 
cancellability it’s like having the cake and 
eating it.   
It is also worth noting that the widespread 
and erroneous idea that particularised 
conversational implicatures are attempts to 
convey speaker meanings together with the 
belief that they can be explicitly cancelled 
leads to absurdity. If an implicature is only 
generated when it is intentionally conveyed 
by a speaker, we would have to admit that in 
explicit cancellation cases the speaker has 
both the intention to convey something by 
means of implicature and the intention of not 
conveying the implicature in the first place, 
which is absurd. If an implicature is an 
intentional speech act, they can’t be 
cancellable.   
One of the main reasons for the 
widespread acceptance of the cancellability of 
implicatures is the misguided notion that 
implicatures can work as a criterion to 
demarcate semantics from pragmatics. The 
rationale is as follows: it is undeniable that 
implication is a semantic process that is 
uncancellable in nature, but it is also self-
evident that implicatures are cancellable. 
Ergo, implicatures must be pragmatic since 
they are implication process that are 
cancellable. But this reasoning is not needed 
to differentiate semantic from pragmatic 
phenomena since they have plenty of other 
distinguishable features in the use of the 
language or simply concede that the 
semantic-pragmatic distinction is blurry. 
The idea that implicatures are non-
cancellable means that they are sui generis. 
On one hand, the pragmatic inference should 
be understood as an inference to the most 
likely explanation, an abduction. But on the 
other hand, the inference is monotonic 
 Bach (2006b: 22).25
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because it can’t be defeated with additional 
information. This implies that a new category 
should be added to the prevalent taxonomies 
of inferences. 
The non-cancellability of conversational 
i m p l i c a t u r e s h a s t w o f a r - r e a c h i n g 
consequences . F i r s t , i t shows tha t 
implicatures have been used as a criterion to 
distinguish pragmatics from semantics for the 
wrong reasons. The reasoning is that we can 
refuse a proposition and accept its related 
implicature, or refuse an implicature, but 
accept the proposition which is its vehicle, 
since the truth conditions of a proposition are 
a semantic phenomenon, but an implicature is 
a pragmatic phenomenon. However, if 
implicatures are non-cancellable and their 
supposed cancellability establish their 
pragmatic character, we will have to accept 
that they are a semantic phenomenon, which 
only reinforces how unreliable cancellability 
is as a demarcation criterion.  
The crux of the matter is that the use of 
implicatures (cancellable or not) was never a 
proper criterion to distinguish semantics from 
pragmatics for the simple reason that an 
implicature can be part of what is literally 
said (e.g., in the ellipse cases), or a logical 
consequence of what is literally said. In some 
cases, what the speaker implicates is precisely 
the semantic content of the sentence he 
asserted or is entailed by it. For instance, 
suppose that someone would say ‘Nobody 
ever made a long jump higher than 28 feet’. 
His reply ‘What do you mean? Bob Beamon 
made a long jump higher than 29 feet a long 
time ago in 1968’. Here you would be 
implicating that Bob Beamon made a long 
jump higher than 29 feet, which is also 
entailed by what is said . 26
The second significant consequence is 
that the Gricean strategy of eliminating 
phenomena as mere cancellable implicatures 
becomes obsolete. One of the main reasons 
why cancellability is such a central feature in 
Grice’s theory of implicatures is that it can be 
employed to eliminate what he considers 
needless theoretical assumptions. Grice 
employed this strategy when he defended a 
causal theory of perception  and later on 27
when he argued that the connectives of classic 
logic such as ‘⊃’, ‘∨’, ‘&’ and their natural 
language counterparts ‘if’, ‘or’, ‘and’, only 
seem to have distinct truth conditions due to 
the presence of generalised conversational 
implicatures associated with the use of the 
last ones . These implicatures, however, are 28
cancellable, so they are pragmatic elements 
that don’t have any semantic significance and 
shouldn’t affect our understanding in logic 
matters. 
This Gricean strategy of eliminating 
phenomena as mere cancellable implicatures 
has an importance in philosophy that cannot 
be overestimated. Blome-Tillmann observes 
that cancellability is important not only in 
philosophy of language and linguistics but 
a l s o i n a r e a s  s u c h a s e t h i c s , 29 30
epistemology , and metaphysics . It is 31 32
arguable that cancellability is also used as a 
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resource in aesthetics  and philosophy of 33
law . But conversational implicatures are 34
non-cancellable, so all this work was in vain. 
4. THE MAXIM OF CONVEYABILITY 
It is important to observe that one can say the 
truth in a misleading way. Joshi argues that 
the maxim of quality should be modified 
having this possibility in mind, since the 
cooperative speaker not only aims to speak 
the truth, as it also tries to avoid leading the 
hearer to accept false conclusions . But 35
although this conversational requirement is 
important, it does not require a revision of the 
maxim of quality for an obvious reason: the 
speaker can only say something true in a 
misleading way if he also violates the maxims 
of quantity and relation. Besides, even if it 
were necessary to create a specific maxim to 
avoid misleading suggestions, it wouldn’t be 
a version of maxim of quality, since it is a 
maxim about our beliefs on what we say. 
It is reasonable to infer the observance of 
a maxim related to the conversational 
expectations about the expressions we use 
and whose aim is to ensure the correction of 
conversational inferences of the hearer. Take 
for instance the sentence ‘If it rains, the match 
was cancelled’. Unless the context suggests 
otherwise, the assertion of such sentence will 
lead the hearer to infer (or assume) that the 
speaker does not know whether it actually 
rained or not. The reason for that is that the 
use of term ‘if’ in the antecedent usually 
indicates the absence of a compromise with 
an established truth value. If a conditional is 
asserted with the antecedent ‘If it rains…’, 
the audience will infer that the speaker does 
not know that in fact rained. This is the most 
r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i s 
communicative intentions in the context of 
assertion given the assumption that the 
speaker is cooperative. After all, if the 
speaker had asserted the conditional only 
because he knew that it had rained he should 
have had made this assumption explicitly in 
the sentence in order to prevent the hearer 
from making an incorrect inference of his 
assumptions. Instead, he should have said 
something along the lines of ‘Since it rained, 
the match was cancelled’. Therefore, the 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n v o l v e s a m u t u a l 
understanding expectation even on the level 
of the expressions we employ. From this, we 
can infer the following maxim from language 
use: 
Maxim of Conveyability 
Use expressions that properly convey 
your beliefs. 
  
This maxim will be observed by a cooperative 
speaker and it is usually observed by speakers 
in conversation. What is more interesting is 
that generalised conversational implicatures 
and conventional implicatures as necessary to 
preserve this maxim. For instance, the 
assertion of ‘She is poor, but honest’ 
implicates that the speaker believes that there 
is a usual contrast between poverty and 
honesty. To use the word ‘but’ without 
accepting their correlated assumptions would 
be misleading and convey false implicatum 
a b o u t t h e s p e a k e r ’s a s s u m p t i o n s . 
Consequently, it would represent a violation 
of the maxim of conveyability. Thus, the 
examples of generalised conversational 
implicatures and conventional implicatures 
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can be both interpreted from an angle in 
which they represent an apparent violation of 
t h e c o o p e r a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n a n d , 
consequently, are required to preserve a 
conversational maxim.  
According to Grice, the pragmatic 
p a r a d o x i c a l a s p e c t i n v o l v e s o n l y 
particularised implicatures, but in a 
counterfactual situation in which the speaker 
didn’t have the assumptions required by the 
vehicles of generalised and conventional 
implicatures would represent a pragmatic 
paradox and v io la te the maxim of 
conveyability. The only way to eliminate this 
paradoxical aspect in these hypothetical cases 
is to draw the implicatures. 
One of the reasons why some authors still 
refuse the notion of conventional implicatures 
is that they don’t fit in the role we would 
expect from implicatures in the semantic-
pragmatic divide. Conversational implicatures 
are on the pragmatic side because they derive 
from conversational circumstances, but 
conventional implicatures are different since 
they are generated from from the meanings of 
particular expressions . A similar suspicion 36
applies to generalised implicatures. Since 
they are language dependent, they appear to 
be governed by the choice of words and not 
conversational expectations. But while 
generalised and conventional implicatures are 
related to particular expressions, they are 
based on conversational dynamics involving 
t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e m a x i m o f 
conveyability, and this maxim is obviously 
pragmatic in character. 
Let me give two examples to show how 
generalised and conventional implicatures 
may involve an apparent violation of the 
maxim of conveyability. First, let’s consider 
an example of conventional implicature. Take 
for instance the sentence ‘She is poor, but 
honest’. If the speaker uttered this sentence 
but doesn’t believe that poor people are 
usually dishonest, his assertion is paradoxical. 
This paradoxical aspect is prevented by the 
convention that precludes such use. Thus,  in 
order to prevent the maxim of conveyability 
from being violated, we have to conclude that 
the implicatum does follow from the choice 
of words. In this case, we have to conclude 
that the speaker’s belief in a contrast between 
the two conjuncts follow from the use of 
‘but’, since he wouldn’t have used an 
expression that don’t convey his beliefs in a 
proper manner. Thus, the notion that 
conventional implicatures arise solely due to 
the conventional features of the words 
employed in an utterance is mistaken. Instead, 
they are determined by an explanation in 
terms of conversational rules.     
N o w c o n s i d e r t h e g e n e r a l i s e d 
conversational implicature of failure 
associated with the word try. According to 
Grice, if one says ‘A tried to do x’ he 
implicates that A failed in his attempt to do 
x . The manner in which this implicature is 37
inferred is as follows: after hearing this 
utterance, listeners will assume that A failed 
in his attempt to do x, since if he had done x, 
the speaker would have said that because he 
is trying to be as informative as required. But 
notice that there is a different way of inferring 
the implicature. The hearer can infer from the 
utterance that A tried to do x that A failed in 
his attempt to do x because otherwise the 
speaker would misleadingly convey 
assumptions he doesn’t have, i.e., he would 
violate the maxim of conveyability. The 
implicature is not determined by the word 
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‘try’, but by what is inferred about the 
speaker on the basis of the utterance and the 
conversational maxims.  
Now, consider the following criticism 
advanced by Bach:  
A typical claim is that in uttering “Some of the 
boys went to the party,” the speaker implicates 
that not all of the boys went to the party. But this 
assumes that the speaker means not one but two 
things, that some of the boys went to the party and 
that not all of them did. Really, though, the 
speaker means only one thing, that some but not 
all of the boys went to the party .  38
The maxim of conveyability also allows us to 
explain the problem with this criticism. My 
reply to this is that the speaker means only 
one thing, namely, that some of the boys went 
to the party. Indeed, he implicates that not all 
of the boys went to the party, but only in the 
sense that this can be inferred from his 
utterance and the maxim of conveyability. 
Otherwise, we would confuse implicature 
with an attempt to convey a speaker meaning. 
If the speaker uttered that some of the boys 
went to the party knowing that all boys went 
to the party, he would be using the expression 
‘some’ in a misleading manner. The only way 
to avoid this conclusion and preserve the 
cooperative expectation is by drawing the 
implicature that not all of the boys went to the 
party. 
5. UTTERANCE IMPLICATURES AND 
ASSUMPTION IMPLICATURES 
According to Grice, there are three types of 
implicatures, namely, conversational 
particularised implicatures, conversational 
generalised implicatures and conventional 
implicatures. More specifically, Grice 
proposed that conversational implicatures are 
(1) part of what the utterance communicates; 
(2) dependent on particular features of the 
context; (3) necessary to preserve the 
cooperat ive assumption; (4) nei ther 
conventionally determined by the meaning of 
the sentence nor conveyed by the specific use 
of certain terms; and (5) cancellable. Grice’s 
characterisation of generalised conversational 
implicatures suggests that they satisfy the 
conditions expressed in (2) (at least to a 
certain degree), (3), and (5), but fail to satisfy 
(1 ) and (4 ) ; whereas conven t iona l 
implicatures fail to satisfy (1)-(5), being 
especially determined by their conventional 
and non-cancellable character. 
T h e e x a m p l e s o f p a r t i c u l a r i s e d 
conversational implicatures presented by 
Grice include two types of speaker meaning 
(figures of speech and ellipsis), and one 
single example of pragmatic implication 
about a speaker’s assumption, namely, that he 
lacks evidence that is relevant for the 
conversation at issue. 
Perhaps with the exception of testimonial 
example presented in (1a), all the remaining 
examples of the Group C presented in Logic 
and Conversation are speaker meanings. For 
instance, irony is explained as a flouting of 
the first maxim of Quality. If I say of 
someone who is known for having betrayed 
me in the past ‘X is a fine friend’, the hearer 
will infer that I’m not being sincere and that 
‘the most obviously related proposition is the 
contradictory of the one he purports to be 
putting forward’ .   39
Next we have the examples of ellipsis 
presented on group A, ‘in which no maxim is 
violated, or at least in which it is not clear that 
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any maxim is violated’. Consider the 
following example: 
A is standing by an obviously immobilized car 
and is approached by B; the following exchange 
takes place:  
A: I am out of petrol.  
B: There is a garage round the corner. (Gloss: B 
would be infringing the maxim 'Be relevant' 
unless he thinks, or thinks it possible, that the 
garage is open, and has petrol to sell; so he 
implicates that the garage is, or at least may he 
open, etc.) .  40
In the example part of what is said is not fully 
explicit, but it is implicated from the 
utterance in order to preserve the assumption 
that he is observing the maxim of relation. In 
this case, both a part of what is said and the 
conversational context implicate the other 
part of what is being said in an inexplicit 
manner. In other words, what is being said in 
a less explicit form is implicated by what is 
being said in an explicit form. What 
motivates ellipsis are considerations of 
brevity. The speaker uses some word as short 
for others because this is more economic. 
Finally, we have Grice’s solitary example 
of a particularised implicature that is neither a 
speaker meaning act nor an ellipsis. This is 
the only example introduced in the Group B: 
A is planning with B an itinerary for a holiday in 
France. Both know that A wants to see his friend 
C, if to do so would not involve too great a 
prolongation of his journey:  
(3) A: Where does C live?  
B: Somewhere in the South of France.  
(Gloss: There is no reason to suppose that B is 
opting out; his answer is, as he well knows, less 
informative than is required to meet A's needs. 
This infringement of the first maxim of Quantity 
can be explained only by the supposition that B is 
aware that to be more informative would be to 
say something that infringed the maxim of 
Quality, ‘Don’t say what you lack adequate 
evidence for', so B implicates that he does not 
know in which town C lives) .  41
B does not say that he does not know in 
which town C lives. This is an assumption 
that can be inferred from what he said.  
The examples of conventional and 
generalised implicatures presented in Logic 
and Conversation are comparatively fewer in 
numbers. The only example of conventional 
implicature in this lecture involves the use of 
the word ‘therefore’: ‘If I say (smugly), He is 
an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. I have 
certainly committed myself, by virtue of the 
meaning of my words, to its being the case 
that his being brave is a consequence of 
(follows from) his being an Englishman’ . 42
The influential example of conventional 
implicature was presented earlier in ‘A Causal 
Theory of Perception’. The utterance of ‘She 
was poor but she was honest’, implies that 
there is some contrast between poverty and 
honesty . These examples are fairly simple: 43
in each case an utterance implicates certain 
speaker’s assumptions. 
Finally, we have generalised implicatures. 
The examples encompass cases involving the 
use of the indefinite articles ‘a’ and ‘an’. If 
the speaker uses expressions such as ‘a X’ or 
‘an X’, he implicates in most circumstances 
that ‘the X does not belong to or is not 
otherwise closely connected with some 
identifiable person’. For instance, if I say that 
‘X is meeting a woman this evening’ this will 
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usually implicate that the person he will met 
was not his wife, mother, sister, etc. In some 
circumstances this implicature is not 
generated. If I say ‘I have been sitting in a car 
all morning’ this would not implicates that 
I’m sitting in someone’s else car. 
Grice division of implicatures into 
conventional and conversational reflects what 
he thought were their important properties 
such as the presence or lack thereof of 
cancellability or whether they are necessary 
or not to preserve the cooperation assumption. 
But the importance of these features for their 
understanding is overrated. It was shown that 
conversational implicatures are non-
cancellable, and that both generalised and 
conventional implicatures are similar to 
particularised ones in that they can also be 
required to preserve the cooperation 
assumption by means of a maxim of 
conveyabi l i ty. Bes ides , genera l i sed 
implicatures are very similar to conventional 
ones. The only difference between them is 
that while conventional implicatures are 
always conveyed by the use of certain 
expressions, generalised implicatures are 
usually conveyed by the use of certain 
expressions. Also notice that the example of 
particularised implicature introduced in the 
Group B is similar to conventional and 
generalised implicatures in that an utterance 
implicates that the speaker has certain 
assumptions. These implicatures have in 
common the fact that they encompass 
speaker ’s assumpt ions that are not 
communicated, but can be inferred from his 
utterance. Let’s call them assumption 
implicatures. The remaining group includes 
implicatures whose implicatum is part of 
what is communicated, namely, speaker 
meanings. We can call them utterance 
implicatures. So particularised conversational 
implicatures will include two types of 
utterance implicatures and one assumption 
implicature. Meanwhile, the examples of 
generalised conversational implicatures and 
conventional implicatures are all assumption 
implicatures. 
This suggests that Grice’s division doesn’t 
cut the conversational dynamics into its 
joints. Instead of discussing three types of 
implicatures (particularised, generalised and 
conventional), we should be discussing two 
types (assumption implicatures and utterance 
implicatures). Of course, we would be also 
better of if the name ‘implicature’ was 
dropped in favour of ‘pragmatic implication’, 
but it’s too late to change now, since the term 
is already ingrained in the literature. This new 
taxonomy is an improvement over Grice’s in 
that it emphasises their distinctive features 
without all the hurdles introduced in the 
William James lectures. 
This d iv is ion be tween u t te rance 
implicatures and assumption implicatures also 
represents an improvement over the existent 
attempts to improve Grice’s taxonomy. For 
example, both Davis and Levinson claim that 
generalised implicature do not involve an 
inference about the speaker intentions . 44
Davis specifically makes a distinction 
between speaker implicature (which is 
dependent on recognising speaker intentions) 
and sentence implicature (which is not, but 
rather involves conventionality), but this 
terminology wrongly suggests that some 
implicatures are about the sentences 
themselves, when they are actually about the 
speaker’s assumptions. 
This becomes clear when we distinguish 
be tween u t t e r ance imp l i ca tum and 
assumptions’ implicatum, since all examples 
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!17
of conveyed implicatum are either about what 
is said or about what is assumed by the 
speaker. This clarifies and reinforces what is 
at stake in the examples of implicatures under 
discussion. The pertinent distinction is not 
between the conventional and intentional 
aspects of meaning, but between speaker’s 
intentions and speaker’s assumptions. They 
are both about the speaker. 
6. TRIVIAL IMPLICATURES ARE 
GENUINE IMPLICATURES 
If every assumption that is necessary to 
maintain the cooperative presumption is an 
implicatum, numerous trivial assumptions 
should be implicated. One example of trivial 
assumption is that the speaker believes in 
what he says. Grice, however, never accepted 
this conclusion and postulated that the only 
genuine implicatures are assumptions that are 
not trivially required to maintain the 
cooperative presumption . This restriction, 45
however, is ad hoc, since trivial implicatures 
follow conceptually from the notion of 
implicature.  
One of the many reasons why Grice 
rejected trivial implicatures is that he 
confused implicatures with attempts to 
convey speaker meaning. When discussing 
his view regarding the Moore’s paradox, he 
observed that: 
On my account, it will not be true that when I say 
that p, I conversationally implicate that I believe 
that p; for to suppose that I believe that p (or 
rather think of myself as believing that p) is just 
to suppose that I am observing the first maxim of 
Quality on this occasion. I think that this 
consequence is intuitively acceptable; it is not a 
natural use of language to describe one who has 
said that p as having, for example, “implied,” 
“indicated,” or “suggested” that he believes that 
p; the natural thing to say is that he has expressed 
(or at least purported to express) the belief that p. 
He has of course committed himself, in a certain 
way, to its being the case that he believes that p, 
and while this commitment is not a case of saying 
that he believes that p, it is bound up, in a special 
way, with saying that p. The nature of the 
connection will, I hope, become apparent when I 
say something about the function of the indicative 
mood . 46
But this criticism only makes sense if we 
understand that the speaker ‘implied’ that he 
believes that p as an action. When we say that 
the speaker implies his belief in p by asserting 
p, the speaker is not really doing an 
implicating action at all. That Grice went on 
to identify the characterisation that the 
speaker implied his belief in p as tantamount 
to the speaker indicating or suggesting his 
belief p only makes this confusion even more 
pronounced. The implicature is a process that 
has a life of its own once the utterance was 
made in the sense the hearer can infer 
something from what the speaker says in a 
particular context, namely, his belief in p 
from his assertion of p. 
It can be also argued that Grice rejected 
trivial implicatures because they don’t fit in 
his taxonomy. Trivial implicatures are 
obviously non-cancellable, e.g., I can’t assert 
that p and then add that I don’t believe in p 
w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i n g m y s e l f i n 
conversational terms. However, trivial 
implicatures are not easily interpreted as 
conventional because the implicatum doesn’t 
follow from a particular choice of words in an 
utterance. In the eyes of Grice this idea would 
be a monstrosity.     
Tr i v i a l i m p l i c a t u r e s m a y s e e m 
theoretically uninteresting, but they are 
 Grice (1978: 114).45
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f u n d a m e n t a l t o G r i c e ’s t h e o r y o f 
conversation. The conversational maxims are 
implicatum themselves since they are 
contextually implied by the use of language. 
Grice was only able to infer that speakers 
followed maxims of quantity because they 
always try to be informative when they talk. 
In other words, a conversational maxim is 
nothing but a pattern that follows from 
speaker’s behaviour.  This means that Grice 
can only infer the existence of conversational 
maxims if trivial expected implicatures are 
accepted. The implicatures that result from 
the violation of maxims ensure that some 
maxims are not trivially implied by the use of 
language. 
Trivial implicatures are also theoretically 
relevant due to independent reasons. The 
trivial implicature that the speaker believes in 
what he says was one of the first uses of the 
notion of contextual implication that 
influenced Grice so much, and it was one of 
the main distinctions in the attempt to solve 
Moore’s paradox. Moreover, it seems that 
trivial implicatures should be relevant to 
Grice’s discussion because it is the only way 
to provide a systematic taxonomy of all and 
every implicature associated with each 
operator of natural language. Grice 
recognised the existence of implicatures 
related to ‘if, then’, ‘or’ and ‘but’, but what 
about the trivial implicatures associated with 
‘and’ and ‘not’? 
Probably one of the reasons for this 
preferential treatment was Grice’s project to 
defend the application of classical logic in the 
face of its counter-intuitive aspects in natural 
language. If we treat conditionals used in 
ordinary language as having the same truth 
conditions of the material conditional of 
classical logic, they will be only false if the 
antecedent of a conditional is true and the 
consequent is false. Otherwise, the 
conditionals are true. These truth conditions 
have counter-intuitive aspects when applied 
to ordinary language. For instance, a 
conditional such as ‘if the moon is made of 
cheese, 2 + 2 = 4’ is true simply because the 
antecedent is false or because the consequent 
is true.  
Grice’s explanation of this paradox was to 
maintain that ‘if, then’ particles convey a 
conversational generalised implicature of 
indirectness according to which the speaker 
has indirect reasons to accept the conditional 
he asserted. Thus, the conditional ‘if the 
moon is made of cheese, 2 + 2 = 4’ seemed 
false, argued Grice, because it was 
conversationally inappropriate, and it was 
conversationally inappropriate because it 
conveyed a false implicature of indirectness. 
After all, the speaker didn’t have indirect 
evidence to assert the conditional. The fact 
that this was a conversational implicature 
(pragmatic phenomenon) which could be 
cancelled, argued Grice, meant that the 
ordinary intuition contrary to the paradoxes of 
the material conditional were unfounded. The 
use of ‘or ’ would convey a similar 
implicature according to which the speaker 
doesn’t which disjunct is true, and the use of 
‘but’ would convey the already known 
implicature of contrast between both 
conjuncts.   
But if the use of the terms ‘if, then’, ‘or’ 
a n d ‘ b u t ’ c o n v e y t h e g e n e r a l i s e d 
conversational implicatures and conventional 
implicatures, respectively, why don’t ‘and’ 
and ‘not’ convey any implicatures? The 
implicature which could be attributed to the 
use of ‘and’ is that the speaker accepts the 
two conjuncts. But this explanation was 
conveniently left out by Grice, since it didn’t 
help him in his task to explain away the 
counter-intuitive aspects of the material 
conjunction. For instance, classical logic 
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allow us to infer from ‘John gave a lecture 
and died’ to ‘John died and gave a lecture’. 
Intuitively, the conclusion is false, since the 
dead can’t give any lectures. But since the 
obvious candidate for implicature of a 
conjunction would not help Grice in 
explaining away these counter-intuitive 
aspects, they were left out.  
The use of ‘not’ also does not convey an 
implicature. The reason is probably because 
the implicature would be trivial, i.e., the 
speaker does not accept the proposition that is 
being denied in the assertion.  
These known facts suggest that Grice only 
postulate implicatures to emphasise the 
preservation of the cooperative assumption in 
paradoxical cases, or to explain away the 
counter-intuitive aspects of particles such as 
‘if, then’ and ‘or’. But this approach seems 
capricious. Grice should offer a systematic 
taxonomy of all and every implicature 
associated with each natural language 
operator, but the only way to achieve this task 
would require the inclusion of trivial 
implicatures associated with ‘and’, ‘not’ and 
so on. 
7. NON-COGNITIVE GOALS 
One could argue that the examples of irony, 
metaphors and other non-literal expressions 
are not entirely cooperative or cognitive 
oriented, since they reveal linguistic goals 
that go beyond the mere exchange of 
information. Of course, Grice was careful to 
recognise that there are other maxims in 
conversational that need to be recognised:  
There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims 
(aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 
‘Be polite’, that are also normally observed by 
participants in talk exchanges, and these may also 
generate nonconventional implicatures. The 
conversational maxims, however, and the 
conversational implicatures connected with them, 
are specially connected (I hope) with the 
particular purposes that talk (and so, talk 
exchange) is adapted to serve and is primarily 
employed to serve. I have stated my maxims as if 
this purpose were a maximally effective exchange 
of information; this specification is, of course, too 
narrow, and the scheme needs to be generalized to 
allow for such general purposes as influencing or 
directing the actions of others .  47
So Grice was aware of the limitations of his 
framework . It is worth noting, however, that 48
h i s t heo ry o f conve r sa t i on canno t 
accommodate most of his own examples of 
particularised conversational implicatures, 
since they can’t be generated without non-
cognitive goals. This is important because 
these examples are usually presented in 
textbooks and entries on the subject as if they 
were representative of how insightful and 
powerful is Grice’s theory of conversation. To 
add insul t to in jury, par t icular ised 
conversational implicatures are usually 
assumed as the paradigmatic examples of 
implicatures and they are the only examples 
that require non-cognitive goals.  
Let’s take for instance the testimonial 
case, which is presented by Grice as a 
 Grice (1975: 47).47
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paradigmatic example of flouting of the first 
maxim of Quantity: 
‘Dear Sir, Mr X’s command of English is 
excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been 
regular. Yours, etc.’ The information given is 
grossly inadequate; the writer appears to be 
seriously in breach of the first maxim of Quantity, 
enjoining the utterer to give as much information 
as is appropriate. However, the receiver of the 
letter is able to deduce that the writer, as the 
candidate’s tutor, must know more than this about 
the candidate. There must be some reason why the 
writer is reluctant to offer the extra information 
that would be helpful. The most obvious reason is 
that the writer does not want explicitly to 
comment on Mr X’s philosophical ability, because 
it is not possible to do so without writing 
something socially unpleasant. The writer is 
therefore taken conversationally to implicate that 
Mr X is no good at philosophy; the letter is 
cooperative not at the level of what is literally 
said, but at the level of what is implicated. In 
examples such as this a maxim is deliberately and 
ostentatiously flouted in order to give rise to a 
conversational implicature; such examples 
involve exploitation . 49
This example can be interpreted in at least 
two ways. Grice’s own interpretation is that 
the speaker flouts the maxim of quantity on 
purpose in order to convey an implicature. In 
other words, what the speaker really means is 
the implicature. This interpretation, however, 
only makes sense if we assume that what the 
speaker uttered should be interpreted non-
literally. This seems a farfetched assumption 
that we shouldn’t concede without further 
argumentation. The speaker has nothing to 
gain by saying mean-spirited things about Mr. 
X in a non-literal way. 
Another way of looking at this example is 
that the speaker is indeed uncooperative, but 
that is because he has other goals besides 
efficiency in transference of information. The 
speaker does not want to turn down the 
request to provide a recommendation letter, 
because he does not want to be rude with Mr. 
X, but at the same time he doesn’t want to say 
things in an insincere way or for which he 
lacks the evidence for, since he is observing 
the super-maxim of quality. Thus, he will 
provide a recommendation letter that contain 
truths that are ultimately unhelpful, since his 
conversational efficiency is compromised by 
his need to be polite. This interpretation 
seems more promising than Grice’s. 
Of course, it could be argued that the 
implicature is still informative, and that the 
hearer would probably have guessed that the 
hearer would connect the dots and conclude 
that the student is not bright. However, the 
reason for the uncooperative assertion was 
not the conveyed implicature, but the fact that 
the speaker was trying to be polite. In fact, 
this politeness consideration is a premise that 
is required to draw the implicature and goes 
b e y o n d c o n v e r s a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y 
requirements. In this case, this example 
should be interpreted not as a figure of 
speech, but as a polite and uninteresting 
utterance. The hearer will draw an inference 
about the lack of Mr. X credentials from that.   
The examples in which Grice believes the 
first maxim of Quality is flouted (irony, 
metaphor, meiosis, and hyperbole) all involve 
a detour from purely cognitive goals in 
conversation . This is so self-evident that 50
doesn’t require additional argumentation. 
Now, consider Grice’s example of an 
implicature conveyed by a violation of the 
maxim of relation: 
At a genteel tea party, A says Mrs. X is an old 
bag. There is a moment of appalled silence, and 
then B says The weather has been quite delightful 
 Grice (1975: 52).49
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this summer, hasn’t it? B has blatantly refused to 
make what HE says relevant to A’s preceding 
remark. He thereby implicates that A’s remark 
should not be discussed and, perhaps more 
specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe .  51
What happens in this case is that the speaker 
is violating the maxim of relation in order to 
correct a rudeness and be polite. It is 
implicated from his utterance that A has 
committed a social gaffe, but this inference 
can’t be drawn from the conversational 
maxims alone. You need to include politeness 
considerations in the mix in order to drawn 
the implicature.  
Grice’s examples in which various 
maxims falling under the super-maxim ‘be 
perspicuous’ are flouted can also be 
interpreted in different ways. Take his 
example in which there is a violation of the 
requirement to avoid obscurity: 
Suppose that A and B are having a conversation in 
the presence of a third party, for example, a child, 
then A might be deliberately obscure, though not 
too obscure, in the hope that B would understand 
and the third party not. Furthermore, if A expects 
B to see that A is being deliberately obscure, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that A is implicating 
that the contents of his communication should not 
be imparted to the third party . 52
It’s safe to say that any prudential 
considerations A and B might have to prevent 
the child to follow the conversation are not 
dictated by cognitive concerns. Grice didn’t 
notice the obvious: what is governing the 
conversation when the maxim is being flouted 
is not an additional cognitive concern.  
Finally, we must consider Grice’s 
example in which a implicature is conveyed 
because the speaker is not brief:  
Compare the remarks:  
(a)  Miss X sang ‘Home sweet home.’  
(b) Miss X produced a series of sounds that 
corresponded closely with the score of ‘Home 
sweet home’ .  53
The reviewer is being sarcastic because Miss 
X’s performance is awful. He knows the 
hearer will connect the dots and infer the 
proper implicatum, but Grice’s own maxims 
are not enough to allow this implicature. We 
need additional and different maxims that go 
beyond efficiency in conversation.   
8. EXPLICIT ‘CANCELLATION’ OF 
IMPLICATURES ARE APOLOGIES 
If conversational implicatures are non-
cancellable pragmatic implications, how 
would we be able to explain the apparent 
examples of explicit cancellation? I will 
discuss two hypothesis. The first is that 
apparent examples of explicit cancellation are 
attempts to avoid misunderstandings by 
means of elucidation of assumptions. This 
proposal face insurmountable difficulties that 
will lead us to a second, and more promising, 
hypothesis, namely, that apparent examples of 
explicit cancellations are apologies. It goes 
without saying that any occurrences of the 
words ‘cancellation’ or ‘cancelled’ from here 
onwards should not be taken literally, since 
implicatures are non-cancellable. The point is 
to figure it out what is the actual process that 
is taking place in apparent cases of explicit 
cancellation.    
 Let’s start with the first hypothesis in 
which the apparent examples of explicit 
cancellation are interpreted as cases in which 
 Grice (1975: 54).51
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the speaker wants to avoid misunderstandings 
by elucidating his assumptions. Suppose that 
a teacher is questioned about whether a given 
student is a good philosopher, and he replies 
saying ‘He is very dedicated’. What he 
literally said is that the student is very 
dedicated, but what was implicated by his 
assertion is that the student is not very smart. 
This implicature, however, would be 
‘cancelled’ if the teacher added later: ‘but I 
would not want to insinuate that the student is 
only hard working, since he is also very 
intelligent’. What occurred in this case is an 
attempt to avoid a misunderstanding. The 
teacher answers saying that the student is very 
dedicated probably because he would like to 
enumerate the qualities of the student, his 
work ethic in this case. However, he knows 
that if he only have said that this would give 
the wrong impression that the student is not 
talented. That’s why he makes a point of 
emphasising that he didn’t mean to suggest 
that he is only a hard working guy, but also 
happens to be very bright. The speaker does 
not want to give the impression that the 
hearer can infer something negative from 
what it was said. 
This would suggest that no implicature is 
cancelled in the true sense of the term, since 
no implicature was conveyed from the 
beginning. The speaker only added a proviso 
to prevent the hearer from believing in a 
implicature that never existed in the first 
place. The explicit cancellation must not be 
understood as its negation, since in this case 
we would be denying what was never 
implicated. Instead, the explicit cancellation 
of an implicature is the negation of a 
implicatum that was never conveyed in the 
context.  
I n a n a t t e m p t t o a v o i d a 
misunderstanding, the speaker, even if he is 
sincere in his intentions, can fail to convince 
his audience that he didn’t accept the 
potential implicatum. In this case the attempt 
t o a v o i d a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g w a s 
unsuccessful. The failure may be caused by 
reasons that are independent of the sincerity 
of the speaker. For instance, one possibility is 
that the speaker fails to convince the speaker 
due to characteristics of that particular 
context or spurious motivations of the hearer. 
Inversely, the speaker may implicate P, denied 
that he had implicated P and still convince his 
hearer due to completely unrelated reasons 
(the speaker can be very charismatic, etc.). 
The cancellation in this qualified sense will 
be successful or not due to a myriad of 
reasons that vary according to the 
interlocutors involved.     
It is undeniable though that in most cases 
any attempt to prevent the implicature will be 
seen as insincere given the conversational 
context and the choice of words made by the 
speaker. This is particularly obvious in the 
allegedly cases of conventional implicatures. 
For instance, suppose I say ‘She is poor, but 
honest’, but then try to cancel the implicature 
adding ‘of course, that does not mean that I 
believe that poor people in general tend to be 
dishonest, since there is no obvious 
connection’. This attempt to deny that there is 
a contrast after asserting the conjunction will 
be perceived as dishonest or unconvincing. 
There are no means to deny that there is a 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f o r t h e r e i s n o 
misunderstanding. See the charge bellow : 54
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Of course, in the example above the speaker 
is being openly rude and trying to taking back 
what he had just said, while in a case of 
cancellation of implicatures the speaker 
would try to suggest that he didn’t say or 
assumed something. That being said, the 
attempt to cancel other implicatures would 
still come out as just as implausible. In fact, it 
is such a needless complicated and risky 
move in a conversation that its very existence 
would require an explanation. That’s why we 
need a different hypothesis. A better way to 
explain this strange phenomenon is that these 
apparent examples of explicit cancellation are 
apologies. The speaker pretends to deny his 
intended meaning (or assumptions) in an 
insincere manner in order to prevent social 
stigma and preserve face. The important thing 
about an apology in such cases is that they 
work as an expression of regretful 
acknowledgment of an offence. The potential 
cancellation cases then can be explained as an 
expression of good manners. 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main criticisms of this paper is that 
particularised conversational implicatures are 
not intent ional acts , conversat ional 
implicatures are non-cancellable, generalised 
and conventional implicatures are beyond 
reproach and trivial implicatures are genuine 
implicatures. If those theses are true, the 
contemporary landscape on the subject will 
have to move in a completely different 
direction.  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